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Abstract
By combining (i) the economic theory of rational expectation bubbles, (ii) behavioral finance on imitation and herding
of investors and traders and (iii) the mathematical and statistical physics of bifurcations and phase transitions, the
log-periodic power law (LPPL) model has been developed as a flexible tool to detect bubbles. The LPPL model
considers the faster-than-exponential (power law with finite-time singularity) increase in asset prices decorated by
accelerating oscillations as the main diagnostic of bubbles. It embodies a positive feedback loop of higher return
anticipations competing with negative feedback spirals of crash expectations. We use the LPPL model in one of its
incarnations to analyze two bubbles and subsequent market crashes in two important indexes in the Chinese stock
markets between May 2005 and July 2009. Both the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite index (US ticker symbol
SSEC) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Component index (SZSC) exhibited such behavior in two distinct time periods:
1) from mid-2005, bursting in October 2007 and 2) from November 2008, bursting in the beginning of August 2009.
We successfully predicted time windows for both crashes in advance (Sornette, 2007; Bastiaensen et al., 2009) with
the same methods used to successfully predict the peak in mid-2006 of the US housing bubble (Zhou and Sornette,
2006b) and the peak in July 2008 of the global oil bubble (Sornette et al., 2009). The more recent bubble in the Chinese
indexes was detected and its end or change of regime was predicted independently by two groups with similar results,
showing that the model has been well-documented and can be replicated by industrial practitioners. Here we present
more detailed analysis of the individual Chinese index predictions and of the methods used to make and test them.
We complement the detection of log-periodic behavior with Lomb spectral analysis of detrended residuals and (H, q)-
derivative of logarithmic indexes for both bubbles. We perform unit-root tests on the residuals from the log-periodic
power law model to confirm the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck property of bounded residuals, in agreement with the consistent
model of ‘explosive’ financial bubbles (Lin et al., 2009).
Key words: stock market crash, financial bubble, Chinese markets, rational expectation bubble, herding, log-periodic
power law, Lomb spectral analysis, unit-root test
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1. Conceptual framework and the two Chinese bubbles of 2005-2007 and 2008-2009
The present paper contributes to the literature on financial bubbles by presenting two case studies and new empir-
ical tests, in support of the proposal that (i) the presence of a bubble can be diagnosed quantitatively before its demise
and (ii) the end of the bubble has a degree of predictability.
These two claims are highly contentious and collide against a large consensus both in the academic literature
(Rosser, 2008) and among professionals. For instance, in his recent review of the financial economic literature on
bubbles, Gurkaynak (2008) reports that “for each paper that finds evidence of bubbles, there is another one that fits
the data equally well without allowing for a bubble. We are still unable to distinguish bubbles from time-varying or
regime-switching fundamentals, while many small sample econometrics problems of bubble tests remain unresolved.”
Similarly, the following statement by former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan (2002), at a summer confer-
ence in August 2002 organized by the Fed to try to understand the cause of the ITC bubble and its subsequent crash
in 2000 and 2001, summarizes well the state of the art from the point of view of practitioners: “We, at the Federal
Reserve recognized that, despite our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact,
that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence. Moreover, it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified
early, could be preempted short of the Central Bank inducing a substantial contraction in economic activity, the very
outcome we would be seeking to avoid.”
To break this stalemate, one of us (DS) with Anders Johansen from 1995 to 2002, with Wei-Xing Zhou since 2002
(now Professor at ECUST in Shanghai) and, since 2008, with the FCO group at ETH Zurich (www.er.ethz.ch/fco/)
have developed a series of models and techniques at the boundaries between financial economics, behavioral fi-
nance and statistical physics. Our purpose here is not to summarize the corresponding papers, which explore many
different options, including rational expectation bubble models with noise traders, agent-based models of herding
traders with Bayesian updates of their beliefs, models with mixtures of nonlinear trend followers and nonlinear
value investors, and so on (see Sornette (2003b) and references therein until 2002 and the two recent reviews in
Kaizoji and Sornette (2009); Sornette and Woodard (2009) and references therein). In a nutshell, bubbles are identi-
fied as “super-exponential” price processes, punctuated by bursts of negative feedback spirals of crash expectations.
These works have been translated into an operational methodology to calibrate price time series and diagnose bubbles
as they develop. Many cases are reported in Chapter 9 of the book (Sornette, 2003b) and more recently successful
applications have been presented with ex-ante public announcements posted on the scientific international database
arXiv.org and then published in the referred literature, which include the diagnostic and identification of the peak
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time of the bubble for the UK real-estate bubble in mid-2004 (Zhou and Sornette, 2003a), the U.S. real-estate bubble
in mid-2006 (Zhou and Sornette, 2006b), and the oil price peak in July 2008 (Sornette et al., 2009).
Kindleberger (2000) and Sornette (2003b) have identified the following generic scenario developing in five acts,
which is common to all historical bubbles: displacement, take-off, exuberance, critical stage and crash. For the
Chinese bubble starting in 2005, the “displacement” and “take-off” can be associated with the split share structure
reform of listed companies in 2005. Before the reform, only about one third of the shares of any listed company in the
Chinese stock market were tradable. The other two-third shares were non-tradable (not allowed to be exchanged and to
circulate between investors), and were owned by the state and by legal entities. The tradable stocks acquired therefore
a significant liquidity premium, and were valued much higher than their non-tradable siblings, notwithstanding the fact
that both gave the same privilege to their owners in terms of voting rights and dividends. Since 2001, the Chinese stock
market entered an anti-bubble phase (Zhou and Sornette, 2004) with the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite index
falling from its then historical high 2245 on 24 June 2001 to the historical low on June 6, 2005. On 29 April 2005,
the China Securities Regulatory Commission launched the pilot reform of the split share structure. The split share
structure reform is defined as the process to eliminate the discrepancies in the A-share transfer system via a negotiation
mechanism to balance the interests of non-tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders. On 4 September 2005, the
China Securities Regulatory Commission enacted the Administrative Measures on the Split Share Structure Reform
of Listed Companies1, which took effect immediately. It is widely accepted that the split share structure reform was a
turning point which triggered and catalyzed the recovery of the Chinese stock market from its previous bearish regime.
For the Chinese bubble starting in November 2008, the “take-off” can be associated with China’s policy reaction on the
global financial crisis, with a huge RMB 4 trillion stimulus plan and aggressive loan growth by financial institutions.
Here, we present an ex-post analysis of what we identified earlier in their respective epochs as being two significant
bubbles developing in the major Chinese stock markets, the first one from 2005 to 2007 and the second one from 2008
to 2009. The organized stock market in mainland China is composed of two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The most important indices for A-shares in SHSE and
SZSE are the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite index (SSEC) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Component
index (SZSC). The SSEC and SZSC indexes have suffered a more than 70% drop from their historical high during the
period from October 2007 to October 2008. Since November 2008 and until the end of July 2009, the Chinese stock
markets had been rising dramatically. By calibrating the recent market index price time series to our LPPL model,
we infer that, in both cases, a bubble had formed in the Chinese stock market and that the market prices were in an
unsustainable state. We present the analysis that led us to diagnose the presence of these two bubbles respectively in
September 2007 and in July 10, 2009 (Bastiaensen et al., 2009), and to issue an advance notice of the probable time
of the regime shifts, from a bubble (accelerating “bullish”) phase to a (“bearish”) regime or a crash. See Fig. 1 for
an overview of the two bubbles and our predictions. The figure shows the time evolution of two Chinese indexes, the
1Available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/n4002120/4069846.html , accessed on 30 August 2009.
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dates when we made our predictions and the time intervals of our predicted changes of regime.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The organization of the paper is the following. In Sec. 2, we present technical descriptions of all the methods used
in this paper. Specifically, they are LPPL fitting procedure, Lomb spectral analysis, unit root tests and change-of-
regime statistic. We present the results of the 2007 and 2009 bubbles in two separate subsections of Sec. 3. In Sec. 4,
we document and discuss the predictions we made for both bubbles prior to their bursting and, further, describe the
observations of both markets indicating that these two bubbles actually did burst. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methods
Our main method for detecting bubbles and predicting the critical time tc when the bubble will end either in a
crash or change of regime is by fitting observed price time series to a log periodic power law (LPPL) model (Sornette,
2003a,b; Zhou, 2007). This is a stochastic fitting procedure that we complement with other techniques, described
below. This philosophy of using multiple measures aids in filtering predictions, in that a candidate prediction must
pass all tests to be considered worthy. These techniques form a toolset that has successfully been put to practice over
the past years by Sornette et al. as described in the introduction. Independently a similar toolset has recently been
developed within the Research Group of BNP Paribas Fortis (Global Markets) on the same methodology but with a
slightly different implementation of the fitting procedure and the Lomb analysis.
2.1. General LPPL fitting technique
Consider a time series (such as share price) p(t) between starting and ending dates t1 and t2. The LPPL model that
we use is
ln[p(t)] = A + Bxm +Cxm cos(ω ln x + φ), (1)
where x = tc− t measures the time to the critical time tc. For 0 < m < 1 and B < 0 (or m ≤ 0 and B > 0), the power law
term Bxm describes the faster-than-exponential acceleration of prices due to positive feedback mechanisms. The term
proportional to cos(ω ln x + φ) expresses a correction to this super-exponential behavior, which has the symmetry of
discrete scale invariance (Sornette, 1998). By varying t1 and t2, we can investigate the stability of the fitting parameters
with respect to starting and ending points.
It is worthwhile pointing out that calibrating Eq. (1) to any given price (or log-price) trajectory will always provide
some fit parameters. That is, any model can be fit to any data. Hence, it is necessary to establish a constraint—the
LPPL condition—to filter all of the fitting results. We filter on three parameters:
tc > t2, B < 0, 0 < m < 1. (2)
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This filter selects regimes with faster-than-exponential acceleration of the log-price with a diverging slope at the
critical future time tc.
There are four nonlinear parameters (tc, m, ω, and φ) and three linear parameters (A, B, and C) in Eq. (1). In order
to reduce the fitting parameters, the linear parameters are slaved to the nonlinear parameters. By rewriting Eq. (1) as
ln p(t) = A + B f (t) + Cg(t) and using an estimate of the nonlinear parameters, the linear parameters can be solved
analytically via:

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. (3)
The implementation of the fitting proceeds in two steps. First, we adopt the Taboo search (Cvijovic´ and Klinowski,
1995) to find 10 candidate solutions from our given search space. Second, each of these solutions is used as an initial
estimate in a Levenberg-Marquardt nonlinear least squares algorithm. The solution with the minimum sum of squares
between model and observations is taken as the solution.
2.2. Stability of fits vs. shrinking and expanding intervals and probabilistic forecasts
In order to test the sensitivity of variable fitting intervals [t1, t2], we adopt the strategy of fixing one endpoint and
varying the other one. For instance, if t2 is fixed, the time window shrinks in terms of t1 moving towards t2 with a step
of five days. If t1 is fixed, the time window expands in terms of t2 moving away from t1 with a step of five days. For
each such [t1, t2] interval, the fitting procedure is implemented on the index series three times. Recall that because of
the rough nonlinear parameter landscape of Eq. (1) and the stochastic nature of our initial parameter selection, it is
expected that each implementation of our fit process will produce a different set of fit parameters. By repeating the
process multiple times, we investigate an optimal (not necessarily the optimal) region of solution space.
By sampling many intervals as well as by using bootstrap techniques, we obtain predictions that are inherently
probabilistic and reflect the intrinsic noisy nature of the underlying generating processes. This allows us to provide
probabilistic estimations on the time intervals in which a given bubble may end and lead to a new market regime.
In this respect, we stress that, notwithstanding the common use of the term “crash” to refer to the aftermath of a
bubble, a real crash does not always occurs. Rather, the end of a bubble may be the most probable time for a crash to
occur, but the bubble may end without a splash and, instead, transition to a plateau or a slower decay. This point is
actually crucial in rational expectation models of bubbles in that, even in the presence of investors fully informed of
the presence of the bubble and with the knowledge of its end date, it remains rational to stay invested in the market to
garner very large returns since the risk of a crash remains finite (Johansen et al., 1999, 2000a).
2.3. Lomb spectral analysis
Fitting the logarithm of prices to the model Eq. (1) gives strong evidence supporting log-periodicity in that stable
values of the angular frequency ω are found. We test this feature further by using Lomb spectral analysis (Press et al.,
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1996) for detecting the log-periodic oscillations. The Lomb method is a spectral analysis designed for irregularly sam-
pled data and gives the same results as the standard Fourier spectral analysis for evenly spaced data. Specifically, given
a time series, the Lomb analysis returns a series of frequenciesω and associated power at each frequency, PN(ω)). The
frequency with the maximum power is taken as the Lomb frequency, ωLomb. Following Sornette and Zhou (2002), the
spectral Lomb analysis is performed on two types of signals.
Parametric detrending approach. The first is the series of detrended residuals, calculated as
r(t) = x−m(ln[p(t)] − A − Bxm), (4)
where x ≡ tc − t and A, B, tc and m have been found via the method of Section 2.1 (Johansen and Sornette, 1999a;
Zhou et al., 2007). As suggested in Eq. (1), the log-periodic oscillations result from the cosine part. The angular
frequency ωLomb is then compared with that found in the LPPL fitting procedure, ωfit.
Non-parametric, (H, q) analysis. The second is the (H, q)-derivative of the logarithmic prices, which has been suc-
cessfully applied to financial crashes (Zhou and Sornette, 2003b) and critical ruptures (Zhou and Sornette, 2002b) for
the detection of log-periodic components. The (H, q) analysis is a generalization of the q-analysis (Erzan, 1997;
Erzan and Eckmann, 1997), which is a natural tool for the description of discrete scale invariance. The (H, q)-
derivative is defined as,
DHq f (x) ,
f (x) − f (qx)
[(1 − q)x]H . (5)
We vary H and q in the ranges [-1, 1] and [0, 1], respectively, and perform the Lomb analysis on the resulting
series. If H = 1 in Eq. (5), the (H, q)-derivative reduces to the normal q-derivative, which itself reduces to the
normal derivative in the limit q → 1−. Without loss of generality, q is constrained in the open interval (0, 1). The
advantage of the (H, q) analysis is that there is no need for detrending, as it is automatically accounted for by the finite
difference and the normalization by the denominator. This method has been applied for detecting log-periodicity
in stock market bubbles and anti-bubbles (Sornette and Zhou, 2002; Zhou and Sornette, 2003b, 2004), in the USA
foreign capital inflow bubble ending in early 2001 (Sornette and Zhou, 2004) and in the ongoing UK real estate
bubble (Zhou and Sornette, 2003a).
2.4. Ornstein-Uhlenbeck and unit root tests
Recently, Lin et al. (2009) have put forward a self-consistent model for explosive financial bubbles, in which the
LPPL fitting residuals can be modeled by a mean-reversal Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process if the logarithmic price
in the bubble regime is attributed to a deterministic LPPL component. The test for the O-U property of LPPL fitting
residuals can be translated into an AR(1) test for the corresponding residuals. Hence, we can verify the O-U property
of fitting residuals by applying unit-root tests on the residuals. We use the Phillips-Perron and Dickey-Fuller unit-root
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tests. A rejection of null hypothesis H0 suggests that the residuals are stationary and therefore are compatible with the
O-U process in the residuals. Our tests use the same time windows as the LPPL calibrating procedure.
2.5. Statistic of change of regime
We define a simple statistic to demonstrate the change of regime in the “post-mortem” analysis of our prediction.
We calculate the difference dco(t) between the closing and opening prices on each trading day and track the fraction
of days with negative dco(t) in a rolling window of T days, with T = 10, 20 and 30 days.
3. Results
In the following two subsections, we present our analysis of the separate 2007 and 2009 bubbles using the methods
described in Section 2.
3.1. Back test of Chinese bubble from 2005 to 2007
3.1.1. LPPL fitting with varying window sizes
As discussed above, we test the stability of fit parameters for the two indexes, SSEC and SZSC, by varying the
size of the fit intervals. Specifically, the logarithmic index is fit by the LPPL formula, Eq. (1):
1. in shrinking windows with a fixed end date t2 = Oct-10-2007 with the start time t1 increasing from Oct-01-2005
to May-31-2007 in steps of five (trading) days and
2. in expanding windows with a fixed start date t1 = Dec-01-2005 with the end date t2 increasing from May-01-
2007 to Oct-01-2007 in steps of five (trading) days.
In the above two fitting procedures, we fit the indexes 124 times in shrinking windows and 15 times in expanding
windows. After filtering by the LPPL conditions, we finally observe 72 (78) results in the first step and 11 (15)
results in the second step for SSEC (respectively SZSC). Figures 2 (a) and (c) illustrate six chosen fitting results of
the shrinking windows for SSEC and SZSC and Figures 2 (b) and (d) illustrate six fitting results of the expanding
time intervals for SSEC and SZSC. The dark and light shadow boxes in the figures indicate 20%/80% and 5%/95%
quantile range of values of the crash dates for the fits that survived filtering. One can observe that the observed market
peak dates (16 October 2007 for SSEC, 31 October 2007 for SZSC) lie in the quantile ranges of predicted crash dates
tc using only data from before the market crash (i.e., using t2 < tc obs).
[Figure 2 about here.]
7
3.1.2. Lomb analysis, parametric approach
Fig. 3 summarizes the results of our Lomb analysis on the detrended residuals r(t). The Lomb periodograms (PN
with respect to ωLomb) are plotted in Fig. 3(a) for four typical examples, which are (t1, t2) = (Mar-13-2006, Oct-10-
2007) and (Dec-12-2005, Sep-07-2007) for SSEC and (Apr-04-2006, Oct-10-2007) and (Dec-01-2005, Sep-09-2007)
for SZSC. The inset illustrates the corresponding detrended residuals r(t) as a function of ln(tc − t). We select the
highest peak with its associated ωLomb.
The values of ωLomb must be consistent with the values of ωfit obtained from the fitting. We plot the bivariate
distribution of pairs (ωLomb, PmaxN ) for different LPPL calibrating windows in Fig. 3(b) and find that the minimum
value of PmaxN is approximately 54 for SSEC and approximately 30 for SZSC. These peaks are linked to a false alarm
probability, which is defined as the chance that we falsely detect log-periodicity in a signal without true log-periodicity.
To calculate this false alarm probability, a model of the distribution of the residuals must be used. We ‘bracket’
a range of models, from uncorrelated white noise to long-range correlated noise. For white noise, we find the false
alarm probability to be Pr ≪ 10−5 (Press et al., 1996). If the residuals have power-law behaviors with exponent in the
range 2-4 and long-range correlations characterized by a Hurst index H ≤ 0.7, we have Pr < 10−2 (Zhou and Sornette,
2002c).
The inset of Fig. 3(b) plots ωfit with respect to ωLomb. One can see that most pairs of (ωLomb, ωfit) are overlapping
on the line y = x, which indicates the consistency between ωfit and ωLomb. The other pairs are located on the line
y = 2x. We can interpret these as a fundamental log-periodic component at ω and its harmonic component at 2ω.
The existence of harmonics of log-periodic components can be expected generically in log-periodic signals (Sornette,
1998; Gluzman and Sornette, 2002; Zhou and Sornette, 2002a, 2009) and has been documented in earlier studies both
of financial time series and for other systems (Zhou et al., 2007). When the harmonics are well defined with close-
to-integer ratios to a common fundamental frequency as is the case here, this is in general a diagnostic of a very
significant log-periodic component.
[Figure 3 about here.]
3.1.3. Lomb analysis, non-parametric (H, Q) approach
In order to non-parametrically check the existence of log-periodicity by means of (H, q)-analysis, we take f (x) =
ln p(t) and x = tc− t with tc = Oct-10-2007 or Oct-25-2007 (the two observed peak dates of the indexes). For each pair
of (H, q) values, we calculate the (H, q)-derivative with a given tc, on which we calculate the Lomb analysis. Fig. 4(a)
illustrates the Lomb periodograms for both indexes with tc = Oct-10-2007, H = 0, q = 0.8 and tc = Oct-25-2007,
H = 0.5, q = 0.7. The corresponding DHq ln p(t), defined by formula (5), is plotted with respect to ln(tc − t) in the
inset. The highest Lomb peak of the resultant periodogram has height PmaxN and abscissa ωLomb, both P
max
N and ωLomb
being functions of H and q.
We scan a 21 × 9 rectangular grid in the (H, q) plane, with H ∈ [−1, 1] and q ∈ [0.1, 0.9], both in steps of
0.1. Fig. 4(b) illustrates the bivariate distribution of pairs (ωLomb, PmaxN ). The inset shows a simple histogram of
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ωLomb. We observe the three most prominent clusters corresponding to SSEC with tc = Oct-10-2007 (Oct-25-2007)
as ω0Lomb = 0.86 ± 0.16 (1.06 ± 0.41), ω1Lomb = 4.04 ± 0.29 (4.33 ± 0.31) and ω2Lomb = 10.05 ± 0.56 (10.59 ± 0.44).
For SZSC with tc = Oct-10-2007 (Oct-25-2007), we find the three most prominent clusters to be ω0Lomb = 0.80± 0.27
(0.75 ± 0.32), ω1Lomb = 4.21 ± 0.38 (4.33 ± 0.31), and ω2Lomb = 9.29 ± 0.29 (9.65 ± 0.27).
The small value of ω0Lomb corresponds to a component with less than one full period within the interval of the
ln(tc − t) variable investigated here. According to extensive tests performed in synthetic time series (Huang et al.,
2000), it should be interpreted as a spurious peak associated with the most probable partial oscillations of a noisy
signal and/or to a residual global trend in the (H, q)-derivative. Then, ω1Lomb is identified as the fundamental angular
log-frequency and ω2Lomb ≈ 2ω
1
Lomb is interpreted as its second harmonic.
[Figure 4 about here.]
3.2. Back test of Chinese bubble from 2008 to 2009
3.2.1. LPPL fitting with varying window sizes
The main results of our analysis for the 2008-2009 bubble is illustrated in Fig. 5. The SSEC and SZSC index
series between Oct-15-2008 and Jul-31-2009 have been calibrated to the LPPL formula given by Eq. (1) in shrinking
and expanding windows. The shrinking windows are obtained by increasing the starting date t1 from Oct-15-2008 to
Apr-31-2009 with a step of five days and keeping the last day t2 fixed at Jul-31-2009. The expanding windows are
obtained by fixing the starting day t1 at Nov-01-2008 and moving the ending day t2 away from t1 from Jun-01-2009 to
Jul-31-2009 in increments of five days. The results are filtered by the LPPL conditions, resulting in 38 (respectively
13) fits for SSEC and 28 (respectively 13) fits for SZSC in shrinking windows (respectively increasing windows).
Figures 5(a) and (c) illustrate six chosen fitting results of the shrinking windows for SSEC and SZSC and Figures 5(b)
and (d) illustrate six fitting results of the increasing time intervals for SSEC and SZSC. The dark and light shadow
boxes in the figures indicate 20%/80% and 5%/95% quantile range of values of the crash dates for the fits that survived
filtering. Our calibration confirms the faster-than-exponential growth of the market index over this time interval, a
clear diagnostic of the presence of a bubble. It also diagnoses that the critical time tc for the end of the bubble and the
change of market regime lies in the interval August, 1-26, 2009 for SSEC and August, 3-9, 2009 for SZSC (20%/80%
quantile confidence interval).
[Figure 5 about here.]
3.2.2. Lomb analysis, parametric approach
We use the Lomb spectral analysis technique to further investigate the log-periodic oscillations of Eq. (1) in both
indexes from Oct-15-2008 to Jul-31-2009. First, we calculate the detrended residuals r(t) in all the surviving LPPL
windows and calculate the Lomb periodogram. The highest peak PmaxN and its abscissa ωLomb are extracted from the
residual Lomb periodograms to plot as points in Fig. 6(a). The inset plots ωfit with respect to ωLomb. One can see
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that most pairs of (ωLomb, ωfit) are overlapping on the line y = x and the other pairs are located on the line y = 2x,
confirming the existence of a strong log-periodic component. Fig. 6(a) shows four clusters of values for ωLomb around
ω1Lomb = 5 ± 1, ω2Lomb = 10 ± 1, ω3−4Lomb = 17.5 ± 2 and ω
5
Lomb = 27 ± 2. The first value ω
1
Lomb can be interpreted as the
main angular log-frequency, while the others are the harmonics of order 2 to 5, with a rather large noise on ω3−4Lomb and
ω5Lomb.
3.2.3. Lomb analysis, non-parametric (H, Q) approach
We next scan a 21 × 9 rectangular grid in the (H, q) plane with H ∈ [−1, 1] and q ∈ [0.1, 0.9], both in steps of
0.1, using tc = Jul-31-2009, a date four days before the peak of the SSEC index. We calculate the corresponding
(H, q)-derivatives DHq ln p(t), defined by formula (5), for this set of H and q values. For each obtained DHq ln p(t), we
estimate the Lomb periodogram and plot the highest Lomb peak PmaxN as a function of its abscissa ωLomb in Fig. 6(b).
The inset shows the simple histogram of ωLomb.
For the Shanghai index (SSEC), the three most prominent clusters correspond to ω0Lomb = 1.12 ± 0.66, ω1Lomb =
4.0 ± 1 and ω3Lomb = 17.6 ± 2.7. We interpret the first cluster, ω
0
Lomb, as due to the noise decorating the power-law.
This is because it corresponds to a component with less than one full period within the interval of the ln(tc− t) variable
investigated here. According to extensive tests performed in synthetic time series (Huang et al., 2000), it is a spurious
peak associated the most probable partial oscillations of a noisy signal. We identify the second cluster, ω1Lomb, as the
fundamental angular log-frequency for SSEC. The second cluster around ω3Lomb is compatible with interpreting it as
being the third harmonics. It is notable that the second harmonic is not visible in this distribution, a phenomenon
which has been reported for other systems (Johansen et al., 2000b) and can be rationalized from a renormalization
group analysis (Gluzman and Sornette, 2002).
[Figure 6 about here.]
3.3. Unit root tests of the 2005-2007 and 2008-2009 Chinese bubbles
We apply unit root tests to the series of residuals for each [t1, t2] interval, where the residuals are calculated by
subtracting the model from the observations. The goal is to investigate the stationarity of the residuals to determine if
a mean-reversal Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a good model for them. The null hypothesis of the unit-root test is that
the series being tested is non-stationary. Rejection of the null hypothesis, then, implies that the series (or residuals in
our case) is stationary. Refer to Section 2.4 for further details.
We calibrate the LPPL model Eq. (1) to the SSEC and SZSC indexes in two representative intervals. The first
interval is from Dec-01-2005 to Oct-10-2007 and the other is from Oct-15-2008 to Jul-31-2009. We scan each interval
with growing and shrinking windows, as described above, and report the fraction PLPPL of these different windows
that meet the LPPL conditions, Eq. (2). We then calculate the conditional probability that, out of the fraction PLPPL of
windows that satisfy the LPPL condition, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected for the residuals. Results
of these tests are shown in Table 1.
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For the time interval from Dec-01-2005 to Oct-10-2007 for the SSEC index (respectively the SZSC index), the
fraction PLPPL = 56.9% (respectively 67.6%) of the windows satisfy the LPPL conditions. All of the fitting residuals
of both indexes reject the null hypothesis at significance level 0.01 based on the two tests, implying that the residuals
are stationary. For the fraction of windows which satisfy the LPPL conditions, the fitting residuals of the SSEC
(respectively SZSC) index can be regarded as generated by a stationary process at the 99.9% (respectively 99%)
confidence level.
For the time interval from Oct-15-2008 to Jul-31-2009, we find that a fraction PLPPL = 94.4% (respectively 74.7%)
of the windows satisfy the LPPL conditions for SSEC (respectively SZSC). All of the fitting residuals of both indexes
reject the null hypothesis at significance level 0.001 based on the two tests, implying that the residuals are stationary.
For the fraction of windows which satisfy the LPPL conditions, the fitting residuals of both indexes can be considered
as a stationary process at the 99.9% confidence level.
[Table 1 about here.]
4. Prior prediction of both crashes
We make the title of this section pleonastic to emphasize that we predicted both crashes with our techniques before
the actual dates of the observed peaks in the two indexes. The previous sections have presented more thorough ‘post-
mortem’ analyses performed after the observed crashes. This section documents the specific but simpler predictions
that we announced in advance.
4.1. 2005-2007 bubble
Two of us (WXZ and DS) performed a LPPL analysis in early September 2007, which led to (i) a diagnostic of
an on-going bubble and (ii) the prediction of the end of the bubble in early 2008. One of us (DS) communicated this
prediction on October 18, 2007 at a prominent hedge-fund conference in Stockholm. The participants, managers of
top global macro hedge-funds, constitute arguably the best proxy for the academic idealization of “rational investors”
with access to almost unlimited resources and with the largest existing incentives to motivate themselves to acquire all
possible relevant information and trade accordingly. These participants responded that the predicted change of regime
was impossible because, in their opinion, the Chinese government would prevent any turmoil on the Chinese stock
market until at least the end of the Olympic Games in Beijing (August 2008). After the communication of October
18, 2007, the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (HSCEI) reached the historical high 20609.10 on 2 November
2007. Afterwards, the first valley HSCEI=15460.72 (-25% from historical high) was reached on 22 Nov 2007 and
the bottom HSCEI=4792.37 (-77% from historical high) was on 29 Oct 2008. On 19 March 2008, HSCEI=11379.91
was another deep valley. These drops occurred after a six-fold appreciation of the Chinese market from mid-2005 to
October 2007.
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4.2. 2008-2009 bubble
4.2.1. The announcement of the prediction
On 10 July 2009, we submitted our prediction online to the arXiv.org (Bastiaensen et al., 2009), in which we
gave the 20%/80% (respectively 10%/90%) quantiles of the projected crash dates to be July 17-27, 2009 (respectively
July 10 - August 10, 2009). This corresponds to a 60% (respectively 80%) probability that the end of the bubble
occurs and that the change of regime starts in the interval July 17-27, 2009 (respectively July 10 - August 10, 2009).
Redoing the analysis 5 days later with t2 = July 14, 2009, the predictions tightened up with a 80% probability for the
change of regime to start between July 19 and August 3, 2009 (unpublished).
[Figure 7 about here.]
The following paragraph and figure 7 are reproduced from the online (and un-refereed) prediction, which is avail-
able in its initial form at the corresponding URL (Bastiaensen et al., 2009).
The result of the analysis is summarized below in the Figure. We analyzed the Shanghai SSE Com-
posite Index time series between October 15, 2008 and July 9, 2009. We increased the starting date of
the LPPL analysis in steps of 15 days while keeping the ending date fixed, resulting in 10 fits. The figure
shows observations of the SSEC Index as black dots (joined by straight lines) and the LPPL fits as smooth
lines until the last day of analysis. The y-axis is logarithmically scaled, so that an exponential function
would appear as a straight line and a power law function with a finite-time singularity would appear with
a slightly upward curvature. Note that the LPPL fits to the observations exhibit this slightly upward cur-
vature. The vertical and horizontal dashed lines indicate the date and price of the highest price observed,
July 6, 2009. Extrapolations of the fits to 100 days beyond July 9, 2009 are shown as lighter dashed
lines. The darker shaded box with diagonal hatching indicates the 20%/80% quantiles of the projected
crash dates, July 17-27, 2009. The lighter shaded box with horizontal hatching indicates the range of all
10 projected crash dates, July 10 - August 10, 2009. These two shaded boxes indicate the most probable
times (with the associated confidence levels) to expect peak and possible subsequent crash of the Index.
The parameters of the fit confirm the faster-than- exponential growth of the Shanghai SSE Composite
Index over this time interval, a clear diagnostic of the presence of a bubble.
4.2.2. What actually happened
On July 29, 2009, Chinese stocks suffered their steepest drop since November 2008, with an intraday bottom of
more than 8% and an open-to-close loss of more than 5%. The market rebounded with a peak on August 4, 2009
before plummeting the following weeks. The SSEC slumped 22 percent in August, the biggest decline among 89
benchmark indices tracked world wide by Bloomberg, in stark contrast with being the no. 1 performing index during
the first half of this year. These striking facts show the detachment of the Chinese equity market from other markets.
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This bubble was probably nucleated by China’s central government’s reaction to the global financial crisis. Besides
announcing the huge stimulus plan on 9 November 2008, a loose monetary policy and regulations caused massive new
loan issuance as shown in Fig. 8. With overproduction and lower global demands, analysts estimate that up to 50% of
the increase in credit was used to speculate in equities, property and commodities 2. Rumours of asset bubbles were
widely heard in the market, but when or if they might crash was unknown as usual.
Note that the change of regime in the SSEC occurred while the total loan of financial institutions was still growing
at close to its peak YoY 35% monthly rate. This illustrates that the change of regime has occurred in absence of
any significant modification of the economic and financial conditions or any visible driving force. This observation,
which should be surprising to most economists and analysts, is fully expected from the mathematical and statistical
physics of bifurcations and phase transitions on which our LPPL methodology is based: a possibly vanishingly small
change of some control parameter may lead to a macroscopic bifurcation or phase transition. Rather than leading to
an absence of predictability, the accelerating susceptibility of the system associated with the approach towards the
critical point can be diagnosed, as we have shown. The very clear change of regime documented here provides a
case-in-point demonstrating this concept of an emergent rupture point characterizing the end of the bubble.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 9 presents the evolution with time of the close-open statistic introduced in subsection 2.5 over the period
from Jan. 2007 to August 25, 2009. The low (respectively high) values of the index correlate well with the ascending
(respectively descending) trend of the market. One can also observe the recent remarkably abrupt jump upward of the
close-open statistic at the time scale T = 10 days, confirming the existence of a sudden change of regime.
[Figure 9 about here.]
These events unfolded in a rather bullish atmosphere for the Chinese stock markets. For instance, Bloomberg
reported on July 30, 2009 that billionaire investor Kenneth Fisher emphasized the great success of China’s economy
compared to the rest of the World and that speculation that the “Chinese government will limit bank loans is un-
founded.” Anecdotal sampling of comments on Chinese online forums suggests a majority of doubters until August
12, after which a majority endorsed the notion of a change of regime. Several commentators stressed again that pre-
dictions of Chinese stock markets cannot be correct since China’s stock markets are heavily influenced by policies
(known as a policy market). These comments are similar to the disbelief of hedge-fund managers mentioned in sub-
section 4.1 concerning the prediction of the change of regime at the end of 2007, before the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
2see, e.g., BNP Paribas FX Weekly Strategist: China Lending Support (31 July 2009); RBS, Local Markets Asia, Alert China: A savings glut is
causing problems (3 July 2009)
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5. Discussion
We have performed a detailed analysis of two financial bubbles in the Chinese stock markets by calibrating the
LPPL formula (1) to two important Chinese stock indexes, Shanghai (SSEC) and Shenzhen (SZSC) from May 2005 to
July 2009. Bubbles with the property of faster-than-exponential price increase decorated by logarithmic oscillations
are observed in two distinct time intervals within the period of investigation for both indexes. The first bubble formed
in the middle of 2005 and burst in October 2007. The other bubble began in November 2008 and reached a peak in
early August 2009.
Our back tests of both bubbles find that the LPPL model describes well the behavior of faster-than-exponential
increase corrected by logarithmic oscillations in both market indexes. The evidence for the presence of log-periodicity
is provided by applying Lomb spectral analysis on the detrended residuals and (H, q)-derivative of market indexes.
Unit-root tests, including the Phillips-Perron test and the Dickey-Fuller test, on the LPPL fitting residuals confirm
the O-U property and, thus, stationarity in the residuals, which is in good agreement with the consistent model of
‘explosive’ financial bubbles (Lin et al., 2009).
While the present paper presents post-mortem analyses, we emphasize that we predicted the presence and expected
critical date tc of both bubbles in advance of their demise (Sornette, 2007; Bastiaensen et al., 2009). These two
successes prolong the series of favorable outcomes following the prediction of the peak in mid-2004 of the real-estate
bubble in the UK by two of us (Zhou and Sornette, 2003a), of the peak in mid-2006 of the US housing bubble by two
of us (Zhou and Sornette, 2006b) and of the peak in July 2008 of the global oil bubble by three of us (Sornette et al.,
2009).
But not all predictions based on the present methodology have fared so well. In particular, Lux (2009) and Rosser
(2008) have raised severe objections, following the failure of the well-publicized prediction published in 2002 that
the U.S. stock market would follow a downward log-periodic pattern (Sornette and Zhou, 2002). How can one make
sense of these contradictory claims? We summarize the present state of the art as follows.
1. Prediction of the end of bubbles should not be confused with predictions based on extrapolation, such
as those associated with antibubbles. There is a confusion between predicting crashes, on the one hand, and
predicting the continuation of an “antibubble” bearish regime, on the other hand. It seems that both Lux (2009)
and Rosser (2008) amalgamate these two issues, when they focus on the failure of the antibubble prediction in
Sornette and Zhou (2002) and conclude that “Sornette and his collaborators failed to forecast future crashes.”
There is indeed a fundamental difference between, on the one hand, (i) the prediction of the end of a bubble
analyzed here, which is characterized by its critical time tc and, on the other hand, (ii) the extrapolation of an
“antibubble” pattern. This difference is similar to that between (i) the prediction of the approximate parturition
time of a foetus on the basis of the recording of key variables obtained during its maturation in the uterus of his
mother and (ii) the prediction of the death of this individual later in old age from an extrapolation of medical
variables recorded during his adult life. The former (i) is associated with the maturation phase (the financial
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bubble versus the uterus-foetus development). It has a rather well-defined critical time which signals the tran-
sition to a new regime (crash/stagnation/bearish versus birth). In contrast, the latter (ii) may be influenced by
a variety of factors, particularly exogenous, which may shorten or lengthen the life of the antibubble or of the
individual. One should thus separate the statistics of successes and failures in the prediction of bubbles on
the one hand and in the prediction of continuation of LPPL antibubble patterns on the other hand. This was
the spirit of the experiment proposed by Sornette and Zhou (2002) to test the distinct hypothesis that bearish
regimes following a market peak could be predicted when associated with LPPL patterns.
2. Intrinsic limits of the prediction of the end of an antibubble. For the reasons just mentioned, it is still an
open problem to determine when an antibubble ends. Our methods show that one cannot avoid a delay of about
6 months before identifying the end of an antibubble (Zhou and Sornette, 2005). This is a partial explanation
for the failure of the 2002 antibubble prediction (Sornette and Zhou, 2002).
3. Track record of the antibubble method. However, one should not forget that, taken as a distinct class sepa-
rated from that of diagnosing bubbles and their ends, the predictions based on the antibubble method can count
several past successes: (a) on the Nikkei antibubble (Johansen and Sornette, 1999b, 2000) and (b) on the Chi-
nese stock market antibubble (Zhou and Sornette, 2004), in addition to the failure mentioned above. This track
record is insufficient to conclude. More tests in real time should be performed and rigorous methods developed
to assess the statistical significance of short catalogs of success/failure predictions can be applied, based on
“roulette” approaches (see Chapter 9 in Sornette (2003b), Bayes’ theorem (Johansen and Sornette, 2000) and
Neyman-Pearson or error diagrams (Molchan, 1990, 1997).
4. What we learned from the antibubble prediction failure. Lux (2009) and Rosser (2008) are right to stress
that the 2002 antibubble prediction of Sornette and Zhou (2002) failed. However, a post-mortem analysis in
Zhou and Sornette (2005) has revealed an interesting fact. While the prediction failed when the S&P500 is
valued in U.S. dollars, it becomes quite accurate when expressed in euro or British pounds (Zhou and Sornette,
2005). A plausible interpretation would be that the energetic Fed monetary policy of decreasing its lead rate
from 6.5% in 2000 to 1% in 2003 has boosted the stock market in local currency from 2003 on, but has degraded
the dollar, so that the net effect was that the value of the US stock market from an international reference point
was unfolding as expected from the analysis of Sornette and Zhou (2002). We do not claim that this changed
the failure into a success. Instead, it illustrates the effect of monetary feedbacks that have to be included in
improved models incorporating fundamental factors, for instance in the spirit of Zhou and Sornette (2006a).
5. Track record for diagnosing bubbles and their ends. Our group has announced advanced prediction (not
just in retrospect) of bubbles and their end (often a crash). The status of these predictions as of 2002 has been
discussed in details in Chapter 9 of Sornette (2003b)’s book. As mentioned above, subsequent successes include
the predictions of the peak in mid-2004 of the real-estate bubble in the UK by Zhou and Sornette (2003a), of the
peak in mid-2006 of the US housing bubble by Zhou and Sornette (2006b) and of the peak in July 2008 of the
global oil bubble by Sornette et al. (2009). The present analysis on two bubbles in the Chinese market provide
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additional evidence for the relevance of LPPL patterns in the diagnostic of bubbles.
6. Recent improvements in methodology. While the core model (or forecasting system) has not changed much
since the late 1990s, several new developments used here allows us to quantify more accurately both the relia-
bility and the uncertainties. These improvements include multi-window analysis, probability estimates, and a
consistent LPPL rational expectation model with mean-reverting residuals. Note that the more recent bubble in
the Chinese indexes was detected and its end or change of regime was predicted independently by two groups
(the first four authors from academia on the one hand and the last two authors from industry on the other hand)
with similar results, showing that the model has been well-documented and can be replicated by industrial
practitioners. In addition, we stress that the method relies essentially on the competition between the posi-
tive feedback loop of higher return anticipations competing with negative feedback spirals of crash expectations
(Ide and Sornette, 2002), which is at the origin of the acceleration oscillations. In the spirit of Lux and Marchesi
(1999) and of Gallegati et al. (2008), this is accounted for in heterogeneous agent models by including nonlin-
ear fundamental investment styles competing with nonlinear momentum trading styles (Ide and Sornette, 2002).
The initial JLS model of Johansen et al. (1999, 2000a) was based on a conventional neoclassical model assum-
ing a homogeneous rational agent, but it also enriched this set-up by introducing heterogeneous noise traders
driving a crash hazard rate. More recently, Lin et al. (2009) have considered an alternative framework which ex-
tends the JSL model to account for behavioral herding by using a behavioral stochastic discount factor approach,
with self-consistent mean-reversal residuals.
In conclusion, given all the above, we feel this technique is the basis of a prediction platform, which we are
actively developing, motivated by the conviction that this is the only way to make scientific progress in this deli-
cate and crucial domain of great societal importance, as illustrated by the 2007-2009 financial and economic crisis
(Sornette and Woodard, 2009).
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Figure 1: Evolution of the price trajectories of the SSEC index and the SZSC index over the time interval of this analysis. The solid red lines
indicate the dates of the respective public announcement of our predictions for the two bubbles (October 18, 2007 and July 10, 2009) while the
grey zones indicate the 20%/80% confidence intervals for which we forecasted the change of regime. Final closing prices shown in these plots are
10,614.3 (SZSC) and 2683.72 (SSEC) from September 1, 2009.
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Figure 2: Daily trajectory of the logarithmic SSEC (a,b) and SZSC (c,d) index from May-01-2005 to Oct-18-2008 (dots) and fits to the LPPL
formula (1). The dark and light shadow box indicate 20/80% and 5/95% quantile range of values of the crash dates for the fits, respectively. The
two dashed lines correspond to the minimum date of t1 and the maximum date of t2 . (a) Examples of fitting to shrinking windows with varied t1 and
fixed t2 = Oct-10-2007 for SSEC. The six fitting illustrations are corresponding to t1 = Sep-30-2005, Dec-05-2005, Feb-13-2006, Apr-24-2006,
Jan-15-2007, and Mar-12-2007. (b) Examples of fitting to expanding windows with fixed t1 = Dec-01-2005 and varied t2 for SSEC. The six fitting
illustrations are associated with t2 = Aug-20-2007, Aug-29-2007, Sep-07-2007, Sep-17-2007, Sep-26-2007, Oct-05-2007. (c) Examples of fitting
to shrinking windows with varied t1 and fixed t2 = Oct-10-2007 for SZSC. The six fitting illustrations are corresponding to t1 = Sep-30-2005, Dec-
12-2006, Feb-24-2006, May-12-2006, Jan-09-2007, and Apr-13-2007. (d) Examples of fitting to expanding windows with fixed t1 = Dec-01-2005
and varied t2 for SZSC. The six fitting illustrations are associated with t2 = Aug-01-2007, Aug-10-2007, Aug-24-2007, Sep-07-2007, Sep-21-2007,
Oct-08-2007.
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Figure 3: Lomb tests of the detrending residuals r(t) for SSEC and SZSC. The residuals are obtained from Eq. (4) by substituting different survival
LPPL calibrating windows with the corresponding fitting results including tc, m, and A. (a) Lomb periodograms for four typical examples, which are
presented in the legend. The time periods followed the index names represent the LPPL calibrating windows. The inset illustrates the corresponding
residuals r(t) as a function of ln(tc − t). (b) Bivariate distribution of pairs (ωLomb, PmaxN ) for different LPPL calibrating intervals. Each point in the
figure stands for the highest peak and its associated angular log-frequency in the Lomb periodogram of a given detrended residual series. The inset
shows ωfit as a function of ωLomb.
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Figure 4: Lomb tests of (H, q)-derivative of logarithmic indexes. (a) Lomb periodograms of DHq ln p(t) for four typical examples, which are tc =
Oct-10-2007 with H = 0 and q = 0.8 for SSEC, tc = Oct-25-2007 with H = 0.5 and q = 0.7 for SSEC, tc = Oct-10-2007 with H = 0 and q = 0.8
for SZSC, and tc = Oct-25-2007 with H = 0.5 and q = 0.7 for SZSC, respectively. The inset shows the corresponding plots of DHq ln p(t) as a
function of ln(tc − t). (b) Bivariate distribution of pairs (ωLomb, PmaxN ) for different pairs of (H, q). Each point corresponds the highest Lomb peak
and its associated angular log-frequency in the Lomb periodogram of the (H, q)-derivative of logarithmically indexes for a given pair (H, q). The
inset shows the empirical frequency distribution of ωLomb.
22
Figure 5: Daily trajectory of the logarithmic SSEC (a,b) and SZSC (c,d) index from Sep-01-2008 to Jul-31-2009 (dots) and fits to the LPPL formula
(1). The dark and light shadow box indicate 20/80% and 5/95% quantile range of values of the crash dates for the fits, respectively. The two dashed
lines correspond to the minimum date of t1 and the fixed date of t2 . (a) Examples of fitting to shrinking windows with varied t1 and fixed t2 =
Jul-31-2009 for SSEC. The six fitting illustrations are corresponding to t1 = Oct-15-2008, Nov-07-2008, Dec-05-2008, Jan-05-2008, Feb-06-2008,
and Feb-20-2008. (b) Examples of fitting to expanding windows with fixed t1 = Nov-01-2008 and varied t2 for SSEC. The six fitting illustrations
are associated with t2 = Jun-01-2009, Jun-10-2009, Jun-19-2007, Jun-29-2007, Jul-13-2007, Jul-27-2007. (c) Examples of fitting to shrinking
windows with varied t1 and fixed t2 = Jul-31-2009 for SZSC. The six fitting illustrations are corresponding to t1 = Oct-15-2008, Nov-03-2008,
Nov-26-2008, Dec-19-2008, Jan-14-2008, and Jan-23-2008. (d) Examples of fitting to expanding windows with fixed t1 = Dec-01-2005 and varied
t2 for SZSC. The six fitting illustrations are associated with t2 = Jun-01-2009, Jun-10-2009, Jun-19-2007, Jun-29-2007, Jul-13-2007, Jul-27-2007.
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Figure 6: Detection of log-periodicity in the Chinese bubble from 2008 to 2009. (a) Plots of PmaxN with respect to ωLomb for different LPPL
calibrating windows. The inset illustrates the dependence of ωfit on ωLomb. (b) Bivariate distribution of pairs (ωLomb , PmaxN ) for different pairs of
(H, q) of (H, q)-derivatives DHq ln p(t), defined by formula (5). The inset depicts the empirical frequency distribution of ωLomb.
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Figure 7: Shanghai Composite Index with LPPL result, as presented in the July 10, 2009 arXiv.org submission of Bastiaensen et al. (2009).
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Figure 8: (left axis, dots) SSEC compared with Total Loans of Financial Institutions as reported by The People’s Bank of China (“Summary of
Sources & Uses of Funds of Financial Institutions” http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english) (right axis, solid line) YoY % monthly change. This shows
graphically the widespread belief that the credit growth has fueled the last Chinese equity bubble.
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Figure 9: Left scale: SSE Composite index from Jan. 2007 to August 25, 2009 (closing price 2980.10). Right scale: fraction of days with negative
(close-open) in moving windows of length T = 10 days (continuous blue line), T = 20 days (dashed green line) and T = 30 days (dotted-dashed
red line).
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Table 1: Unit-root tests on the LPPL fitting residuals for SSEC and SZSC index in our two calibrating ranges. PLPPL denotes the fraction of
windows that satisfy the LPPL condition. PStationaryResi.|LPPL denotes the conditional probability that, out of the fraction PLPPL of windows that
satisfy the LPPL condition, the null unit test for non-stationarity is rejected for the residuals.
index calibrating
range
number of
windows PLPPL
signif.
level
percentage of rejecting H0 PStationaryResi.|LPPLPhillips-Perron Dickery-Fuller
SSEC 2005/12/012007/10/10 146 56.9%
α = 0.01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
α = 0.001 95.2% 95.2% 100.0%
SZSC 2005/12/012007/10/10 139 67.6%
α = 0.01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
α = 0.001 81.3% 81.3% 72.3%
SSEC 2008/10/152009/07/31 54 94.4%
α = 0.01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
α = 0.001 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
SZSC 2008/10/152009/07/31 54 74.7%
α = 0.01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
α = 0.001 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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